Washington
The US government's decision to publish new intelligence that
appeared to undermine the White House's hardline policy on Iran's
nuclear ambitions may seem puzzling.
But experts who keep a close eye on US intelligence agencies believe
they have a pretty good idea of why the spies wanted the information
out in the open, even if it raised questions about President George
W. Bush's policy.
"They're saying, in effect, we are not the puppets of this or any
administration, we will present our findings even if they don't
correspond to the latest press statement by the White House," said
Steven Aftergood, an intelligence analyst at the Federation of
American Scientists in Washington.
US intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, took the brunt of the
criticism for intelligence blunders over Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction - used by Bush to justify the 2003 US-led invasion but
never found.
Critics suggested that the CIA bent to White House pressure in
interpreting the intelligence and told Bush and his top aides what
they wanted to hear.
Postwar bickering between the White House and the CIA was settled
when Bush ordered sweeping reforms of the US intelligence community.
The National Intelligence Estimate released Monday contradicted
White House allegations that Iran was pursuing atomic weapons,
concluding that Tehran ended the programme in 2003 and appeared less
determined to obtain a nuclear bomb than was believed in a 2005
intelligence report that was the cornerstone of Bush's Iran policy.
"Since our understanding of Iran's capabilities has changed, we felt
it was important to release this information to ensure that an
accurate presentation is available," said Donald Kerr, deputy
director of the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI).
Bush insisted Tuesday that Iran remains dangerous and that US policy
will not change and that Iraq could covertly resume the weapons
programme. He said the new assessment showed that his intelligence
reforms were working.
"It's important for the American people to see that there's been a
re-evaluation," he said.
But the analysts believe the White House had little choice but to go
along with publicizing the new estimate. Otherwise, intelligence
officials might have used the more harmful method of leaking it to
the press to protect themselves from being castigated in the event
of another policy failure.
"There is incentive inside the intelligence community because they
felt burned by what happened with the Iraq intelligence, and that
contributes even more to the forces that would have brought this
into the open," said John Prados, a senior analyst at the National
Security Archive, an independent Washington think tank.
A spokeswoman for the ODNI, Venee Vines, said the White House did
not sign off on publishing the report. The decision was "not at all"
connected to the mishap over Iraq. "It had nothing to do with
previous political decisions," she said.
Aftergood said that ultimately the president is the final arbiter of
what information is declassified for public consumption, and
theoretically could have thwarted the release of the new
intelligence estimate.
"But there would be a price to pay for that in terms of relations
with the intelligence agency leaders," he said.
By allowing the estimate to be published, Bush and his aides were
able go before reporters and put their own spin on it.
"It's a political ploy to stay ahead of the story," Prados said,
"knowing they would be damaged if it came out in a different
fashion."
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